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CASES NOTED
&,Co., 5 the decision was that "[S] tate action [is] essential to show a
direct violation of . . . Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights
... ,M The fact that the Court skirted any decision in Griffin on the
contention that section five of the fourteenth amendment empowers Con-
gress to reach purely private actions may indicate that this avenue of
expansion may not have been as completely rejected as Adickes would
seem to indicate.
Therefore, the Griffin decision must be viewed both as a culmination
of the decisional law in this area over the past twenty years as well as an
indication that private conspiracies, on a case-by-case basis, may be re-
dressable in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3). In addi-
tion, Griffin v. Breckinridge may indicate that future expansion of the
scope of the Civil Rights Statutes under section five of the fourteenth
amendment is still a possibility.
DAVID A. FREEDMAN
DAMAGE REMEDY FOR FEDERAL VIOLATION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS: BELL v. HOOD, CHAPTER TWO
Plaintiff brought an action in a federal district court for damages
alleging that federal officers acting under color of federal law had violated
his fourth amendment rights. Defendants, federal narcotics agents, had
entered and searched plaintiff's apartment without a warrant and had
manacled and humiliated the plaintiff in the presence of his family. The
defendants threatened the members of the entire household with arrest
and later interrogated, booked, and strip-searched the plaintiff at the
federal courthouse. The district court dismissed the action on two
grounds: lack of subject matter jurisdiction and want of a claim upon
which relief might be granted.' On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit' ruled that the district court did have jurisdiction over
the subject matter,3 but affirmed on the grounds that the plaintiff had
not set forth a claim upon which relief might be granted. On certiorari
35. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
36. Id. at 152.
1. Bivens v. 6 Unknown Named Agents Of the Federal Bureau Of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp.
12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of the Federal Bureau Of Narcotics, 409
F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
3. Id. at 720. The court based its conclusion on Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946),
where it was held that a "complaint,. . drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Con-
stitution-or -laws of the United States, . . ." constitutes a federal question so as to confer
jurisdiction on the court. Bell at 681-82. The Court also held that "the failure to state a
proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction." Bell at 682.
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to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded:
Violation of a fourth amendment right by a federal officer acting under
color of federal authority gives rise to a federal claim for damages.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of Federal Bureau O Narcotics,
91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
Bivens is the first case since Bell v. Hood which has addressed itself
to the question of the possibility of a money damage claim for violation
of a fourth amendment right. In Bell, it was held that a claim which
seeks recovery directly under the Constitution of the United States is
of "sufficient merit to warrant [the] exercise of federal jurisdiction. . ..
However, the Court specifically left open the question of whether such
a complaint stated an actionable claim since such a determination was
thought more properly "decided after and not before the court had as-
sumed jurisdiction over the controversy."6
When Bell was remanded, the federal district court accepted juris-
diction as ordered, but dismissed the complaint on the merits, finding
that "neither the Constitution nor the statutes of the United States give
rise to any cause of action" for damages resulting from the violation of
fourth amendment rights by federal agents acting under color of federal
authority.7
Two questions which had been left open by Bell were before the
Court in Bivens; first, whether the claim advanced was a state or federal
claim, and second, whether a remedy for money damages could be fash-
ioned for a violation of fourth amendment rights if a federal claim were
present.
In regard to the first of these two questions, the Second Circuit held
that Biven's claim constituted only a common law state action for tres-
pass, and that the fourth amendment would apply only "to increase the
efficacy of the trespass remedy by preventing federal law enforcement
officers from justifying a trespass as authorized by the national govern-
ment."8 Consequently, fourth amendment rights and claims would serve
only to limit the defenses available to a defendant in a state trespass
action.
This contention was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court9 which
4. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). See note 3 supra.
5. Id. at 684. The Court held that jurisdiction could be properly invoked under the
general federal question jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940), which provided
that the federal district courts had original jurisdiction of
all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity . . . where the matter in
controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000,
and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority .... [forerunner of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1970)].
6. Id. at 682.
7. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 821 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
8. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of the Federal Bureau Of Narcotics, 409
F2d 718, 721 (2d Cir. 1969).
; 9. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of Federal Bureau Of Narcotics, 91 S. CL
1999, 2002-04 (1971).
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pointed out that the fourth amendment was not limited to the proscrip-
tion of conduct prohibited by state law if engaged in by a private per-
son.' The rights protected by that amendment and the rights protected
by state trespass laws were not only dissimilar at times, but might even
be mutually repulsive." As an example, the Court pointed to decisions
where federal fourth amendment rights have been abridged, while at the
same time state law has not been violated.'2 Also emphasized were the
many wiretapping cases which have established that the rights under
this amendment are not to be measured in terms of "technical trespass
under the local property law" or by "ancient niceties of tort ... law."'1
The majority of the Court in Bivens firmly stated that not only were
fourth amendment protections not tied to state-protected rights, but that
the interests protected by common law trespass and invasion of privacy
actions "may be inconsistent or even hostile" to "those protected by
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. ,,14
It was further reasoned that while a private citizen is free to deny
or allow access to his home by another, the existence of such alter-
natives is not to be presumed when a federal officer is demanding entry.'5
Indeed,
[t]he mere invocation of federal power by a federal law en-
forcement official will normally render futile any attempt to
resist an unlawful entry or arrest by resort to the local police;
10. Id. at 2002-03.
11. Id. at 2003.
12. In Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), it was held that liquor improperly
seized by state officers without a warrant and turned over to federal authorities for prosecu-
tion under federal law was improperly admitted as evidence and should have been excluded
regardless of the existence of probable cause at the time of seizure. Evidence was also ex-
cluded where a federal officer participated with a state officer in a search and seizure which
was illegal by federal constitutional standards, though not necessarily illegal by state stan-
dards. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
13. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). In that case it was held that
evidence acquired as a result of a spike microphone planted in a heating duct was inadmis-
sible since the actual penetration of such a device constituted a physical intrusion of the
premises in violation of the fourth amendment. Earlier cases had held that electronic
eavesdropping which was accomplished without the unauthorized physical penetration of an
area protected by the fourth amendment would not constitute a violation of that provision.
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942). See also the progenitor of the penetration requirement, Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S, 438 (1928).
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the rubrics of penetration set down in
Goldman, On Lee, and Olmstead and scrupulously distinguished in Silverman were aban-
doned. There the Court rejected the " 'trespass' doctrine . . . as controlling" and stated that
"[tihe fact that the electronic device . . . did not happen to penetrate . . . can have no
constitutional significance." Katz at 353. In so ruling, the Court reversed a conviction based
upon evidence obtained from electronic monitoring of a conversation on a public telephone.
14. Bivens, 91 S. Ct. 'at 2003.
15. Id. at 2003-04.
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and a claim or authority to enter is likely to unlock the door as
well.'8
Although an action for trespass is barred when entry is allowed (even
after demand)," 7 an action based on a violation of fourth amendment
rights is not necessarily abrogated under identical circumstances.
Faced with the limited effectiveness of state trespass actions, the
unsettling nature of the federal intrusion, and the inability of state law
to either absolve federal agents of constitutional restrictions on conduct"
or to limit the "extent to which federal authority can be exercised,"' O
the Court found that "the federal question becomes not merely a possible
defense to [a] state action, but an independent claim both necessary
and sufficient" to constitute an actionable federal claim.20
Having recognized the existence of a federal claim, the Court then
turned to the question of whether a remedy could be fashioned for a
violation of this right. While the Bell Court had left the question unan-
swered, that Court had set out some general guidelines.
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief: And it
is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
an invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.2 '
The Second Circuit had expressed much concern over the absence of
any case or statute expressly authorizing money damages for the viola-
tion of fourth amendment rights. The appeals court cited several appel-
late authorities in support of its position "that statutory authority is a
prerequisite for a federal cause of action for damages, even though the
wrong complained of is the violation of a constitutional right ... .
However, the Supreme Court looked to and followed a long line of deci-
sions which adopted a contrary view.2
16. Id. at 2004.
17. Id. at 2003. For a discussion of "consent" as a bar to a. tort action, see W. PRossER,
TnE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
18. Bivens, 91 S. Ct. at 2004. The first federal exclusionary evidence cases held that
evidence seized as a result of a lawful state search and seizure, and which was otherwise
admissible in state courts, would not be admissible in federal courts if the circumstances of
acquiring the evidence fell below fourth amendment standards. Byars v. United States, 273
U.S. 28 (1927) and Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). See note 12 supra. See
also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887),
which held that "[t]he State has no power to impart ... any immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States."
19. Bivens, 91 S. Ct. at 2004. See In re Neagle, 13S U.S. 1 (1890). See also Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
20. Bivens, 91 S. Ct. at 2004.
21. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of the Fedeial Bureau Of Narcotics, 409
Fa2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1969). 7
23. Bivens, 91 S. Ct. at 2004-05.
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As early as 1886, the Court recognized that "[i]t is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen."2 4 Even
earlier, appropriate remedies had been fashioned when a citizen's prop-
erty was taken from him by the government without lawful authority.25
In the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth
centuries, the Court frequently shaped remedies to redress wrongful acts
which violated the constitutional rights of the citizen.
In Wiley v. Sinkler,20 the Court suggested that the refusal to allow
a man to exercise his constitutional right to vote made out a federal claim
for money damages. Two years later in a similar voting rights case, it
was held that jurisdiction of the federal courts was properly invoked if
the claim arose under the Constitution, even if such a right of action was
not specified in any statute or in the Constitution itself.2I
It became well established that remedies created by the federal
judiciary do not necessarily require statutory recognition to be valid."
Even where a claim arises under a specific statute which does not pro-
vide a particular remedy, the courts may still fashion one under certain
circumstances. 29 The right of federal courts to grant injunctive relief
for constitutional violations has been repeatedly upheld when such a
remedy was indicated.3"
Before Bivens was decided, several remedies were available for
violations of fourth amendment rights. These included: injunctions
against further violations, exclusion of evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing,31 criminal prosecution of the federal officers responsible for the
violation,32 and injunctive and monetary relief in certain instances in-
volving state officers.33 However, none of these remedies were effective
24. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
25. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
26. 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
27. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
28. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). See also Seaboard Air Line R.R. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923) ; Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927).
29. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In that case the Court held that a
money damage remedy could be fashioned for a complaint claiming under The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
30. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); But see Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746
(1971). See also City of Mitchell v. Dakota Central Tel. Co., 246 U.S. 396 (1918) ; Central
Kentucky Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 290 U.S. 264 (1933).
31. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).. See also notes 12-13 supra. It is interesting to note that
Chief Justice Burger addressed his entire dissent in Bivens to an attack on the exclusionary
evidence rule. The Chief Justice suggested that the rule should be abolished and proposes, in
its stead, a statutory enactment which would provide (1) a waiver of sovereign immunity
as to illegal acts of police, (2) damage action created for damages sustained as the result of
violations of the fourth amendment, (3) creation of a quasi-judicial body to adjudicate
claims, (4) a provision indicating that this remedy is in lieu of exclusion of evidence, and
(5) a provision that no evidence will ever be excluded from criminal proceedings due to a
fourth amendment violation. Bivens, 91 S. Ct. at 2012-21 (dissenting opinion).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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for the person whose rights were violated by a federal officer and against
whom no criminal charges had been preferred.
The Court thus concluded that absent an explicit congressional
mandate to the contrary, Webster Bivens was entitled to redress his
injury through a particular remedial mechanism available in the federal
courts, namely money damages. Thus, twenty-five years after the Court
first addressed itself to this question in Bell, the Court ruled that the
violation of fourth amendment rights by a federal agent acting under
color of federal authority states a federal claim for money damages upon
which relief may be granted.1
4
JOSEPH P. KLOCK, JR.
MANDATORY REFERENDUM AND APPROVAL FOR
LOW-RENT HOUSING PROJECTS: A DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION?
The United States Housing Act of 19371 established a federal hous-
ing agency authorized to offer aid in the form of loans and grants to
state agencies for slum clearance and low-rent housing projects. Califor-
nia was one of many states to take advantage of the Federal Housing
Act through the creation of local agencies.' However, two of California's
local agencies were prohibited from applying for funds8 under the federal
act by operation of a California constitutional provision4 requiring ap-
34. Apart from the practical problem of finding a jury that will award money against
federal officers while engaged in their official capacities, a more serious problem may face
Webster Bivens on remand, namely the defense of immunity from prosecution. In response
to the federal district court's ruling that it would bar the action (Bivens, 276 F. Supp. at
15), Petitioner argued extensively in his brief that the sovereign immunity defense ought not
to be permitted. However, the Supreme Court noted the Second Circuit had not ruled on the
point and declined to consider it.
In 1946, the Court in Bell reversed a district court for dismissing a fourth amendment
damage claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court did not, however, determine
whether such a claim was actionable because that point was not before the Court. On
remand, the lower court dutifully accepted jurisdiction, but dismissed the cause on the
grounds that an actionable claim had not been presented.
Twenty-five years later, the Bivens Court has advanced the argument begun in Bell,
and ruled that such a claim is actionable. The Court, however, failed to address itself to the
defense of immunity because, like Bell, the issue was not before it. Whether Webster Bivens
will get his day in court and a remedy for his injuries is yet to be seen.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
2. See CAL,. HEALTH AND SAFErY CODE § 34240 (West 1970).
3. This occurred twice in San Mateo County in 1966 and once in Santa Clara County
in 1968.
4. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired
in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors
of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop,
[Vol. XXV
